The cognitive radio (CR) based IEEE 802.22 is a standard for wireless regional area networks (WRANs), which is allowed to utilize TV bands when no interference is present to incumbents (i.e. TV receivers and microphones). Compared to other existing networks, it has larger coverage range and provides broadband access in rural and remote areas with performance comparable to DSL and cable modems. It is a promising networks for future wireless communications. When multiple networks deployed by different wireless service providers overlay each other in the same area, they would have to compete to access available TV channels. When more than one WRANs accesses the same channel, the interference occurs. This will cause some given quality of service (QoS) requirements to be unsatisfied. Appropriate strategy such that finding an available channel with minimum cost is needed. In this paper, we formulate the problem as a noncooperative game and establish the Nash equilibrium. Both theoretical and experimental analysis are conducted and demonstrate that the proposed strategy can find an available channel with smaller cost than that of other strategies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radio (CR) is a promising technology that can significantly enhance the utilization of radio spectrum for future wireless communications by allowing cognitive radio users (CRUs) to access unlicensed radio spectrum [1] . CR is a novel concept for improving the utilization of scared radio frequency spectrum. The mechanism of using unlicensed radio spectrum for CR is sensing before accessing. The level of interference to primary users (PUs) must be below acceptable. That is, CR can not access the an unlicensed frequency band until the frequency band is currently not occupied by the primary users (PUs). When it senses the used frequency band is accessed by the PUs, it must vacate the frequency band. The main advantage of CR is that it can achieve reliable communication anytime and anywhere [2] . IEEE 802.22 is a novel standard, which is based on CR, for wireless regional area networks (WRANs). The objective of WRANs is to provide broadband access in rural and remote areas. WRANs operate in the TV bands between 54 MHz and 862 MHz. Multiple overlapped WRANs service providers compete to use these unlicensed channels. Since the advantage of better propagation characteristics at TV channels, WRANs has a much larger coverage range than existing networks. Normally, the coverage range can go up to 33 Km at 4 Watts EIRP [3] . The networks operate in a point to multiple point basis (P-MP), where the a base station (BS) services a number of consumer premise equipments (CPEs). Before allocating TV channels to CPEs, a BS must sense that the channels are currently not utilized by licensed incumbents (i.e. TV receivers and microphones). When the WRANs sense that the current used TV channels are accessed by the licensed incumbents, they must vacate the channel within the channel move time (2 seconds) and switch to some other unutilized channels [4] . Since the spectrum management among competing WRANs are distributed and the coordination amongst WRANs of different service providers does not exist, several networks overlayed each other may switch to the same channel when sensing incumbents' existence. The interference among these networks occurs. The interfered networks have a binary action: stay in the same channel or switch to a different channel, causing some quality of service (QoS) requirements among the networks are not satisfied. How to minimize the interference among IEEE 802.22 networks and ensure the given QoS requirements is a challenge issue for IEEE 802.22 standard. These independent networks can be considered to seek their own benefits or utilities noncooperatively. Thus, the self-coexistence problem can be regarded as a noncooperative game. A game theory framework for solving the self-coexistence problem is first proposed in [5] . The paper focuses on how to select a strategy such that expected cost of staying in the same channel equal to expected cost of switching to a different channel. However, the paper does not further analyze the expected cost in the game.
Game theory is a powerful tool developed to model the interactions of agents with conflict interests. When applying game theory, there is an assumption: each agent in the game is rational. Assume there are more than one agents and each agent's payoff possibly depends on other agents' actions, game theory can be applied to analyze the decision making process. Since too many practical problems can be formulated in such model, game theory has been widely applied to economics, biology, engineering and political science [6] . Moreover, game theory also is an appropriate tool for analyzing 978-1-4244-4657-5/09/$25.00 c 2009 IEEE ICICS 2009 some interesting problems in wireless communication systems for two reasons [7] . 1) Wireless communication systems are often built on standards, (e.g. CDMA system). Devices for accessing these systems are built by a number of different manufactures. Sometimes some manufactures may have an incentive to develop products with selfish behavior such that they have better performance than products developed by other manufactures. In order to maintain a stable system with predefined performance as designed, an appropriate strategy for making the selfish behavior unprofitable is needed; 2) In many cases, users in wireless communications are distributed and make their decisions independently. An individual's payoff is based on not only its action but also other users' actions. Game theory can help to choose a good decision for the users. Especially, game theory has been applied to solve different kinds of efficient resource allocation problem in wireless communications [8] - [12] . The uplink power control of a multiuser MIMO system is formulated as a non cooperative game in [8] . [9] formulates the radio resource management (RRM) in a heterogenous wireless access environment from the viewpoint of game theory. In [12] , the equilibrium point between the base station and a connection for IEEE 802.16 broadband wireless networks is studied.
In this paper, we consider the system model with multiple overlapping WRANs operated by multiple wireless service providers competing to seek available channels for their individual CPEs. When interference occurs, each network does not have information on other networks' next action: stay or switch. Each network makes decision independently. Therefore, the self-coexistence problem can be formulated as a noncooperative game. We analyze equilibrium points under different scenarios. We also compare the proposed strategy with other strategies and find that the proposed strategy achieve better performance.
The paper is formulated as follows. We formulate the selfcoexistence problem in Section II. The propose strategy for the self-coexistence problem in IEEE 802.22 is represented in Section III. Simulation results are illustrated in Section IV and the main conclusion is in Section V
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we consider there are N available TV channels and M competing IEEE 802.22 networks (players) operated by different wireless service providers. These IEEE 802.22 networks overlap each other. If two networks operate the same channel, the interference between them will occur. When the interference occurs, the IEEE 802.22 networks only have two actions: stay in the same channel or switch to another available channel. If it takes steps to find an available TV channel for a WRAN user such that the QoS requirements for real-time data streams can not be satisfied, the system performance will degrade. On the other hand, different IEEE 802.22 networks operate independently instead of being controlled by an central authority. It is impossible to cooperate with each other. How to maintain the predefined QoS among IEEE 802.22 networks is an important issue on the proposed IEEE 802.22 standard. The objective of each IEEE 802.22 networks is to find a strategy such that the expected cost of finding an available channel is minimum, i.e. maintaining self-coexistence. The WRANs is illustrated in Fig. 1 . Each IEEE 802.22 network operates in a distributed way. On the other hand, Game theory deals primarily with distributed optimization. The self-coexistence problem can be formulated as a non-cooperative game.
A. Representation of Game Theory
An N players game can be expressed in normal form: G = (A 1 , . . . , A N ; u 1 , . . . , u N ), where A i denotes the strategy set for player i and μ i : A 1 × A 2 × · · · × A N → R represents the i th player's utility function. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , N} represent the set of players and a = (a 1 , . . . , a N ) = {a i } i∈N denote a strategy profile of all the players. Therefore, a ∈ A = A 1 × · · · × A N , where A is the set of strategy profiles of all the players. Let A −i = A \ A i be the set of strategy profiles of all the players except player i and a −i = a \ {a i } be a strategy profile of all the players except player i. Then we have a = (a i , a −i ). Note that a player's utility depends not only on his own strategy but also on the strategies chosen by other players. Moreover, each player i tries to maximize its u i . Definition 1: Nash equilibrium: A strategy profile a = (a i , a −i ) is said to be a Nash equilibrium if and only if
Note that a equilibrium point corresponds to a steady state of the game from the definition. In a Nash equilibrium, any play can not achieve better utility by changing its strategy while no decreasing other players' utilities. When determining strategies for a game, we need to find the equilibrium points. On the other hand, Pareto efficiency is another important concept for application of game theory. that
Definition 2: Pareto Efficiency: A strategy profile a ∈ A is said to be Pareto efficient if there is no strategyã ∈ A such
with strictly inequality for at least one i. That is to say, there no improvement if a strategy profile a ∈ A is Pareto efficient. Therefore, a Nash equilibrium with Pareto efficient will be preferred. However, many Nash equilibria may be Pareto inefficient in noncooperative games [13] .
we use an example game matrix in Fig. 2 to illustrate the above two definitions. It's a two-player game. Player 1 has two choices: Up and Down; Player 2 has three choices: Left, Middle and Right. In this case, we assume the two players choose their actions simultaneously. The ordered pair in each box denotes the payoff corresponding to each player's action. Player 1's payoff is listed first in the ordered pair. From Fig.2 , note that there are two Nash equilibria (Up,Left) and (Down,Right). But only (Up,Left) is Pareto efficient. Therefore, a Nash equilibrium is not necessary Pareto efficient. Moreover, sometimes none of Nash equilibria are Pareto efficient in a game.
III. PROPOSED STRATEGIES FOR SELF-COEXISTENCE PROBLEM IN IEEE 802.22
Without loss of generality, we focus on a particular player i ∈ N. The same strategy applies to all other players due to homogeneity of all players. The binary action set for player i can be represented as
Since all players have the same action set, we use α 1 and α 2 to denote the action stay and switch, respectively. There are two results corresponding to these actions, noninterference and interference. Let β 1 and β 2 be noninterference and interference, respectively. Suppose the switch probability for i th player in step k is p i k . There are M k remnant players and N k available channels in step k. Then we get the mean switch probabilitȳ
. . , M k } denote the set of players. Then we have
where P i k (β 1 |α 1 ) and P i k (β 1 |α 2 ) represent the probability of noninterference in step k under the action of stay and switch, respectively. Let C i t,k and C i w,k be the cost of noninterference in step k for i th player under the condition of stay and switch, respectively. If i th player finds an available channel in step k, the expected cost is
According to (4) and (5), we get the probability of interference in step k under the action of stay and switch shown as follows:
LetC i t,k andC i w,k be the cost of interference in step k for i th player under the action of stay and switch, respectively. If i th player does not find an available channel in step k, the expected cost is
Accordingly, our objective is to minimize the expected cost
. (10) whereC 0 = 0 and M 0 = M . p = [p 1 , . . . , p M ] is the switch probability matrix and p i = [p i 1 , . . . , p i K ] represents the strategy selected by i th player. K denotes the number of steps to find available channels for all players. Therefore, the utility function for i th player can be defined as
The i th player wants to select appropriate (p i 1 , . . . , p i K ) to maximize its utility.
Based on the definition in (11), we need to find the equilibrium point p * = (p * 1 , . . . , p * M ) such that
Remark 1: Note that the utility function for i th player is dependent on p i and p −i . Moreover, the strategy in step k + 1 is dependent on the strategies in step 1, 2, . . . , k. Since each player doesn't know other players' strategies, it is difficult to calculate K directly.
In order to solve the problem, we propose a greedy method to find (p i 1 , . . . , p i K ) for i th player. The expected cost in step k is formulated as
In each step, the i th player wants to minimize its step cost function. Then the utility function is redefined as
. ∀i ∈ m k (14) Clearly, the utility function defined in (14) is simpler than that of (11) . In this paper, our objective is to minimize the expected cost in each step.
For the convenience of representation, we use p to denote
In practice, player i does not know other players' actions, i.e. the values of p * −i . In this case, it is difficult to derive the Nash equilibrium point for player i. In this paper, we assume the action costs for all players are equal in each step. For example, the time taken for the action is a typical cost. That is,
hold in each step. Accordingly,p k = p 1 k = · · · = p M k k in step k. The utility function defined in (14) becomes a single variable function.
The optimal strategy for the competing 802.22 networks is to identify an optimal p * that maximize the utility function of (14). The optimal p * is the p when the corresponding game theory model reaches its Nash equilibrium.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we study the strategies for self-coexistence problem in IEEE 802.22 under different network settings. First, we setC t,k = 300+50(k−1), C t,k = 30+10(k−1),C w,k = 500 + 60(k − 1) and C w,k = 60 + 20(k − 1). Second, in order to study the impacts of available channels and players on the switch probability in each step, we study the comparison of step cost function in (13) for different N and M settings in step k = 6. The fluctuation of expected cost function according to the switch probability is illustrated in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 . Fig. 3 shows that the expected cost function is an increasing function of the number of players for a given switch probability. Moreover, in order to minimize the step utility function in each step, the switch probability should increase when the number of players is increasing. Fig. 4 shows the expected cost function is a decreasing function of the number of available channels for a given switch probability. Note that the expected cost first decreases and then increases with the switch probability. This shows that the equilibrium point is the interior value of C.
In order to get a deeper insight to the impacts of M and N on the Nash equilibrium, we now investigate the Nash equilibrium in each step for different pairs of (M, N ) setting. The corresponding equilibrium point in each step is obtained by average over 5000 realization. The results are illustrated in Table I . The theoretical cost approximates to the simulation cost under different pairs of (M, N ) settings. The networks can find an available channel quickly with a local minimum expected cost. In order to analyze the performance of our proposed strategy for the self-coexistence problem, we plot the comparisons of proposed strategy, fixed strategy and random strategy under different pairs of (M, N ), where fixed strategy means switch probability is always equal to 0.5. The results are illustrated in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 .
From Fig. 5 , the expected cost associated with the proposed strategies is the smallest under different pairs of (M, N ). Compared to the fixed strategy, the random strategy is sometimes better and sometimes worse. Given number of available channels, the expected cost is an increasing function of players. Fig. 6 shows the comparisons expected cost versus the number of available channels for different strategies. Given the number of players, the expected cost is an decreasing function of the number of available channels. Compared to the expected cost associated with the other two strategies, the expected cost associated with proposed strategy is much smaller under different number of available channels.
V. CONCLUSION IEEE 802.22 is an important standard for WRANs for broadband access in rural and remote areas. Multiple overlapped IEEE 802.22 networks compete to access the same spectrum bands will interfere each other, i.e., the self-coexistence problem. Improper strategy for the selfcoexistence problem will increase the interference among different WRANs. Some prescribed QoS requirements will not be satisfied. We formulate the self-coexistence problem as a noncooperative game and derive the Nash equilibrium. Both theoretical and experimental analysis are conducted. Simulation results show that experimental cost approximates the theoretical expected cost. Moreover, the proposed strategy obtains better performance than other strategies.
